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BACKGROUND 
Countries in the former Soviet Union (FSU) have similar 
institutions that provide financial services in rural areas, 
their main differences being the degree of macroeconomic 
stability and the extent of reform in which they operate. 1 In 
the past these institutions were mainly used as fiscal agents 
rather than as financial intermediaries. The dismantling of 
centrally planned economies, the loss of fiscal and monetary 
discipline, and inflation have wrecked these organizations. 
Economic chaos is dissolving their ability to fund investments in 
agriculture and eliminating their capacity to finance 
economically-justified shortfalls in the operating expenses of 
agricultural firms. 
The effect of credit shortages on near-term agricultural 
production is difficult to assess. Demand for more agricultural 
credit can, in part, be due to economic stress and rent seeking, 
rather than due to the lack of funds for profitable investments. 
Law and order, land tenure security, availability of modern 
inputs, and attractive prices are stronger determinants of farm 
production than is credit. In some cases, nevertheless, lack of 
credit may hinder input and product markets in the short run. In 
the long run, an efficient rural financial system is essential to 
lubricate rural development. In large part, there are no rural 
financial markets in the FSU, just the institutional wreckage 
left from economic reforms that are twisting through the region. 
These markets must be reconstructed in the near future to support 
rural development. 
This poses several questions for the Bank: 
1. If the Bank intervenes in rural finance, what objectives 
should it pursue? 
1The term 'rural financial markets' encompasses agricultural 
credit, deposit mobilization, financial services provided to non-
farm rural enterprises, and also covers formal and informal 
financial transactions in rural areas. 
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2. What lessons can be drawn from previous experiences with 
reforms of rural financial markets elsewhere that might be 
applicable in the FSU! 
3. Zf agricultural production has high priority, can the Bank 
determine the severity of credit constraints, their 
location, and thereby decide where to focus interventions! 
4. What options does the Bank have for intervention and how 
should they be sequenced? 
OBJECTZVES 
Should the Bank intervene in rural finance primarily: 
A. to stimulate agricultural production! 
B. to support privatization? or, 
c. to build efficient and durable financial systems! 
What priorities should be assigned to these objectives! 
credit programs that help to achieve A and B may make it more 
difficult to accomplish c. The Bank, for example, might fund an 
emergency credit program that targets loans at selected 
agricultural activities and sets terms that result in negative 
real rates of interest. Such a program could be targeted 
primarily at private enterprises and thus help to achieve 
objectives A and B. The fact that the Bank acquiesced to loan 
targeting and subsidies--thus resuscitating the old credit 
system--may retard future reforms. zn addition, credit programs 
that extend traditional lending practices will likely suffer 
defaults. Making a clean break with the old system is an 
important step for the Bank to consider. This break involves 
using financial markets differently by allocating loans based on 
creditworthiness rather than on need, and also protecting the 
interests of depositors. 2 
zn most FSU countries the volume of funds that the Bank 
might provide for rural credit will be small compared to the size 
of the agricultural sector. zt seems reasonable to focus these 
limited funds on reinforcing the qrowth of private firms, rather 
than on spreading them more thinly over the entire sector. The 
non-reformed firms have more latitude to make barter arrangements 
that partially substitute for finance and likely have more access 
to traditional sources of credit than do private firms. 
2A creditworthy loan is based on the ability and willingness 
of the ~rrower to repay borrowed funds. Loans basad on need 
emphasize other lending criteria. 
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EXPERIENCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
Finance activities in low-income countries and in countries 
that have sUbstituted market forces for central plans may provide 
some insights that are useful in the FSU. 
Low-income countries 
The Bank and other donors have four decades of experience 
with agricultural credit in low-income countries. 3 until the 
1980s these efforts were characterized by concessionary interest 
rates, both on credit lines from the central bank to the ultimate 
lender, and on loans made to farmers--even lower interest rates 
were imposed on depositors. It was also common for these program 
to target loans at selected economic activities, investments, 
regions, or groups. Negative real rates of interest, hefty 
administrative costs, and loan defaults caused these programs to 
be chronically dependent on outside funding. Many of the 
agricultural credit institutions supported by donor efforts have 
since become insolvent or disappeared. The unsatisfactory 
performance of many of these programs caused several donors, 
including the Bank and the Agency for International Development 
(A.I.D.), to avoid agricultural credit activities during the late 
1980s and early 1990s.4 
support for these traditional agricultural credit programs 
was further weaken by uncertainty about whether loans were vital 
in stimulating production, use of new technologies, or 
investments. In some cases additional lendinq was associated 
with more production, adoption of new technoloqies, and 
investments. But it is unclear how many of these chanqes would 
have occurred without loan programs to support them. Major 
portions of the Green Revolution in Asia during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, for example, occurred without the assistance of 
targeted credit programs; the large increase in production of 
cocaine in Latin America during the 1980s also happened without 
credit support. several countries--Brazil, sri Lanka, and the 
Philippines beinq examples--suffered sharp declines in the real 
value of agricultural credit during the 1980s with little chanqe 
in growth of aqgregate farm output. several studies in the 
Philippines found that product prices, availability of modern 
farm inputs and their prices, investments in infrastructure, and 
3Bvaluations of some of these programs are provided by 
Donald (1976) and the world Bank (1993a). 
4The "Levy Report" was the main reason for the Bank's 
backing away from agricultural credit (World Bank, 1989&). 
criticism of traditional credit projects and a shift in 
development priorities explain A.I.D.'a down qrading of 
aqricultural credit programs. 
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economic stability were more important determinants of 
agricultural growth than was volume of credit (Sacay, Agabin, and 
Tonchoco; Rosengrant and Herdt). 
Traditional credit programs were also criticized because 
they increased income concentration and proved to be 
unsatisfactory second-best policy options (Gonzalez-Vega; Malik 
and others). Subsidies in credit programs were distributed 
regressively because they were proportional to the size of loan: 
large loan, large subsidy; small loan, small subsidy; no loan, no 
subsidy. since only relatively well-off people receive loans--
especially large loans--they usually ended up with most of the 
subsidy. Due to fungibility, subsidized and targeted credit 
proved to be ineffective in offsetting the adverse effects of 
other policies or conditions; cheap credit did not make 
unprofitable activities profitable. Excess demand for cheap 
credit often resulted from subsidy seeking rather than from a 
surfeit of high return investment opportunities. 
These problems culminated in a World Bank Task Force report 
in 1989 and the World Development Report in 1989 that both called 
for less credit subsidies and targeting to stimulate production 
and investments, and more emphasis on strengthening financial 
markets. The Inter-American Development Bank made similar 
changes in policies during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Former centrally-planned economies 
Reforms in financial markets in Eastern Europe are underway 
and, as a result, have not been systematically studied. Earlier 
reforms in Chile and the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) have 
been partially documented. Chile's reforms resulted in extremely 
high real rates of interest on agricultural loans in the late 
1970s (Corbo; Diaz-Alejandro; McKinnon 1991). Accompanied by a 
breakdown in bank supervision, this led to extensive adverse 
selection in lending, loan defaults, and a collapse of the 
banking system. At the same time the extremely high real rates 
of interest discouraged loan demand for purposes that had 
expected returns which were otherwise attractive, but lower than 
the high real rates of interest. This led McKinnon (1991} to 
conclude that fiscal and monetary reforms, leading to moderation 
in inflation, are prerequisites for interest rate liberalization. 
There is no aggregate information to show that turmoil in 
financial markets seriously crimped agricultural production in 
Chile during this period (Valdez and Quiroz). Attractive farm 
prices and profitable export opportunities more than offset the 
adverse effects on production of high interest rates. 
Reforms in the PRC since 1978 were more gradual and caused 
much less disruption and inflation than is occurring in the FSU. 
As a result, the formal rural financial system--largely comprised 
of the Agricultural Bank of China and a large number of Rural 
credit Cooperatives--was not disrupted by reforms. Large amounts 
of rural deposits comprised a substantial portion of the funds 
lent and interest rate policies protected deposits. In larqe 
part, the rural financial system in the PRC has been increasingly 
used to intermediate between surplus and deficit units, rather 
than as a channel for targeted credit and subsidies. Increases 
in rural incomes also allowed farmers to self finance and to 
extend informal loans to others. The low profile of formal 
credit in agricultural development in the PRC is reflected in the 
lack of attention paid to this topic by students of China 
development, such as Perkins and Yusuf. Nevertheless, recent 
research by Feder and others shows that an expanded and more 
efficient formal financial system would ameliorate inefficiencies 
in resource allocation. Cho provides evidence from Korea that 
supports Feder's findings. 
Partial reforms 
Fraqmentary information from countries that have done 
partial reforms provides additional insights. several countries, 
for example, have recently privatized and liberalized their 
fertilizer markets--Bangladesh, Bqypt, Kenya, and Ghana being 
examples. This, in turn, caused a refocusing of credit. Formal 
loans to farmers for purchase of fertilizer decreased, more 
lending was done to agents participating in the import-
production-marketing of fertilizer, and informal loans emerged to 
facilitate transactions not directly supported by formal loans.5 
At least in Eqypt, fertilizer dealers felt compelled to provide 
informal loans to compete for customers. Liberalized product 
prices in several countries, including Eqypt, also enhanced the 
incentives farmers had to use fertilizer. 
During the 1960s and 1970s the Indonesian government 
fomented several phases of a large traditional agricultural 
credit program, under the acronym of B~, that involved 
subsidies and loan targeting. BIHAS collapsed in the early 1980s 
because of loan defaults and government fatique from continual 
requests to recapitalize the program. Instead of abandoning the 
financial infrastructure created by BIMAS, the government 
substantially reformed the system, liberalized interest rates, 
stressed deposit mobilization, revised bank employee incentives, 
and switched from making loans on the basis of need to making 
creditworthy loans. Almost immediately, recovery performance 
substantially improved and in less than a decade the system was 
mobilizing more deposits than were being lent (Yaron, 1992). 
5see Ghate and also Chandra for descriptions of how informal 
credit arrangements in Asia support various types of marketing 
transactions. 
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Perhaps the most interesting feature of this experience was 
how quickly a poorly performing system was transformed into one 
that ~attar supported development (Patten and Rosengard). This 
suggests that similar rapid changes may be possible in the FSU if 
proper policies are adopted and agricultural production is 
profit~le, as was the case in Xndonesia. 
summary of lessons 
The reforms in the FSU are off-the-scale when compared to 
recent reforms in other countries. They involve turning 
political systems inside-out, civil turmoil, a tearing apart of 
production and marketing units, rampant inflation, dealing with 
huge price distortions, major declines in living standards, and a 
transformation of the financial system from one that was largely 
passive, to one that is an active participant in the economy. 
Further, there is little memory in the FSU of how a private 
sector operates--unlike China and Poland--and many people in the 
FSU have deeply held prejudices against individuals involved in 
private markets. 
Experience from low income countries, from other formerly 
centrally planned economies and from partial reforms provides 
useful guidelines on what to avoid and some insights on the 
elements that are necessary to build durable financial systems in 
rural areas. These experiences also suggest that agriculture in 
general has a good deal of staying power and is able to muddle 
through for a time when financial markets are disrupted. These 
experiences also show that farmers are creative in devising 
substitutes for formal finance including barter, self finance, 
and informal finance. Host importantly, it is obvious that fara 
prices, availability of critical inputs and new technology, and 
the prices of purchased inputs are far mora potent in influencing 
farmers' production decisions than is credit. 
CREDXT CONSTRAXNTS 
Although often attempted, estimates of credit demand are 
problematic, especially where financial systems are used to 
process loan-default and interest-rates subsidies. The effective 
demand for any subsidy is virtually infinite. 
Estimation pro~lems are worse when potential borrowers are 
stressed ~y depressed prices or yields, and ~y other economic 
turmoil. Questions ~out credit needs elicit self-serving 
answers when subsidies are expected. The refrain that I'• from 
the government and X'm here to help is often responded to by the 
reflaz "we need credit." Selecting cases where borrowed :funds 
can ~e used efficiently and repaid, froa aany cases of credit 
need is the main task of an efficient credit systea. Resources 
cannot ~e efficiently allocated within a complex econoay unless 
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this screeninq is done effectively. zn part, centrally planned 
economies collapsed because financial markets were not allowed to 
screen; loans vent to units that were least efficient in their 
use of marqinal resources instead of to those that were most 
efficient, thereby vastinq resources. 6 
Zn the absence of a financial system that is effectively 
screeninq borrowers, there is no systematic way to estimate the 
extent to which credit constraints hinder farm investments and 
production. One is forced to use proxies for this. Zf 
production units are stable, representative case studies of farm 
investment opportunities shed liqht on credit constraints. These 
case studies may also illuminate the extent to which self 
finance, barter arranqements, leasinq, and informal financial 
provisions are substitutinq for formal loans. It may also be 
possible to use economic data on production units assembled by 
planninq offices to sort out the importance of credit constraints 
on units that have not been refor.med. 7 
Zf production units and markets are beinq reformed and 
prices are distorted, studyinq farm markets may shed liqht on 
credit constraints. Por example, sharp declines in the use of 
inorqanic fertilizer and farm chemicals may be due to credit 
shortaqes--they may also be due to market disruptions or to major 
increases in input prices, combined with expected low product 
prices. The importance of credit in this must be determined on 
the qround by individuals who understand local aqricultural 
practices and markets. 
until farm production units are reformed and rural financial 
markets are strenqthened it will be difficult for the Bank to 
quickly develop credit proqrams that extend loans to larqe 
numbers of farmers on the basis of creditworthiness. This may 
force the Bank to concentrate its interventions on relaxinq 
credit constraints that may impede farm markets, instead of 
lendinq directly to farminq units. 
BCONOKZC AND PINANCZAL BNVZRONMBNT 
PSU countries lie alonq a continuum of economic conditions. 
on one end of the continuum--the relatively stable end--are the 
several countries that have moderate rates of inflation, are at 
~his important point was clarified by McKinnon and Shaw in 
books published in 1973. 
7nocumentinq credit constraints is one thinq; desiqninq 
credit proqrams that effectively relieve these disparate 
constraints is a separate and, often, an even aore difficult 
probl-. 
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least p~rt way thro~gh re~or.ming their production and marketing 
enterpr1ses, have l1bera11zed prices, have effective fiscal and 
financ~al controls, and which enjoy political stability. 
countr1es at the other end of the continuum--the chaotic end--may 
suffer civil war, have no competent fiscal system, have few 
effective financial controls, have serious price distortions, 
have unreformed production and marketing systems, and have 
escalating inflation. The Bank has a number of traditional 
options for intervention at the stable end of this continuum, but 
has few options--aside from waiting--in countries at the chaotic 
end. The most challenging situations are among those countries 
in the middle of this continuum that have turned the reform 
corner and are becoming more stable. 
The Bank's decision to intervene might turn largely on the 
following criteria: the rate of inflation, agricultural pricing 
policies, interest rate policies, extent of privatization, and 
willingness of the government to allow existing or new financial 
institutions to make creditworthy loans. 
Inflation 
Inflation is a useful measure of the degree to which a 
country has its fiscal and monetary house-in-order (McKinnon, 
1991). High rates of inflation, especially if these rates are 
accelerating or are unpredictable, dissolve financial 
intermediation. The Bank should avoid funding agricultural 
credit until annual inflation rates decline below so percent and 
are predictable. If governments are stoking inflation by 
printing money, they have the option of directing additional 
funds to agricultural credit without the Bank's assistance, 
assuming credit shortages are critical. Local governments should 
be able to discern these shortages more accurately than can the 
world Bank from afar. 
Prices 
Economically, farm income is more than a one-to-one 
substitute for borrowed funds. If farm incomes are depressed due 
to unfair pricing of farm products, the government is withdrawing 
purchasing power from agriculture to the benefit of other sectors 
of the economy. These low prices are essentially taxes that 
depress the rates of return producers expect from investments, 
lessen the ability and willingness of farmers to self finance 
productive activities, and undermine loan collection. 
concessionary loans fail to treat these problems for two 
reasons: they do not alter the low returns caused by the price 
controls, and it is virtually impossible to match the subsidy 
tied to the loan with the tax imposed by price controls. A firm 
that is substantially disadvantaged by product price controls may 
receive no loan or only a small loan, for example. At the same 
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time, another firm may receive a large loan and sUbsidy, but bear 
none of the tax because it avoids producing the commodity that 
suffers the worst price distortion. 
The Bank might justify a policy or sector loan if it is 
conditioned on adjustments in food prices, but it is awkward to 
encourage these types of policy changes through credit projects. 
Higher prices would allow more self funding, increase the rates 
of return on farm investments, irrigate informal financial 
markets, and enhance loan repayment capabilities. Xf the 
government refuses to rationalize farm prices, it is assigning a 
low priority to agriculture. Bank interventions in rural 
financial markets cannot be effective until priorities are 
adjusted. 
znterest rates 
Prices in financial markets are likewise important. 
Providing financial services in rural areas is expensive and 
depositors should be paid positive real rates of return on their 
savings. Xf governments insist on providing cheap credit they 
are consigning the rural financial system to subsidy dependency 
(Yaron, 1991a). Political intrusions into the lending process, 
loan targeting, and loan defaults foster the dependency syndrome. 
Bank interventions in rural financial markets work best where 
farm prices and interest rate policies have been liberalized. In 
cases where distortions remain, price reforms should precede bank 
funding of agricultural credit programs. 
Even when interest rates have been liberalized, credit 
projects are still problematic in highly inflationary economies. 
Xf loans are properly indexed to compensate lenders for all 
inflation, a Bank credit program is likely to encounter loan 
disbursement problems. Farmers are often unwilling to pay 
nominal interest rates that are variable and which may involve 
three digits, especially when they are uncertain about the prices 
they will receive for their products. Lending at extreaely high 
nominal interest rates is likely to attract man1 borrowers who 
may not repay their loans (Stiglitz and Weiss). 
Privatization 
If the Bank decides to focus most of its credit assistance 
on the emerging private sector, thus encouraging refor.a, a 
significant number of private farmers and private aqribusinesses 
should be in place before the Bank provides funds for 
agricultural credit. If they are not present, any Bank credit 
programs should foster for.aation of private firms. 
8t;rhe Bqyptian proverb, "A Bankrupt and a usurer do not 
disagree," conveys the same aessage. 
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capacity to make creditworthy loans 
Bank~ accustomed to satisfyinq credit needs lack capacity to m~e cred1twortby loans. It.will take several years to develop 
tb1s capacity by either for.m1ng new institutions and traininq new 
employees, or by reforming existinq institutions and retraining 
their employees. Developinq this capacity miqbt be the objective 
of a regional traininq project alonq the lines outlined in a 
recent World Bank regional traininq project proposal for Russia 
(World Bank 1993f). Bank assistance in rural finance miqht be 
made continqent on a country beqinninq this retraininq. 
The inability to make creditworthy loans will likely 
restrict the Bank's funding of rural credit projects for the next 
several years in most countries in the PSU. 
INTERVENTION OPTIONS AND TIMING 
Bank options for interveninq in rural financial markets 
depend on macroeconomic conditions and on the status of reform in 
each country. Possible interventions miqht be arrayed alonq the 
continuum mentioned earlier, from chaotic to relatively stable. 
Chaotic 
Countries that lack fiscal and monetary discipline, that 
have done little privatization, that suffer hiqh rates of 
inflation, and that maintain low food prices offer few 
opportunities for Bank interventions in rural finance. 
Substantial interventions must await further reforms, 
liberalization of prices, and more stability--liberalized product 
prices being the most crucial precondition. 
To prepare foundations for future projects in rural finance 
the Bank miqht consider three initiatives: startinq policy 
dialoques on what should be done once economies are aore stable, 
strengthening and reforminq institutions that train employees of 
rural financial institutions, and encouraqinq leqislation that 
supports a reformed financial market. Beyond this, desiqninq 
projects around the frinqe of finance should be viewed as stop-
qap measures. 
Pew policy makers in the PSU appreciate the difference 
between loans based on need and those based on creditworthiness. 
They are likewise vaque on the difference between usinq financial 
markets as fiscal instruments and employinq thea as financial 
intermediaries. It would be useful to expose these policy aakers 
to the new thinkinq about rural finance that bas become 
conventional wisdom in washinqton and to also assist them in 
aakinq contact with people havinq similar interests outside the 
reqion. The Bconomic Development Institute aay be able to 
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conduct policy seminars along these lines and the Food and 
Agriculture organization might establish a regional credit 
association that ties professionals in the FSU who work in rural 
finance to individuals with similar interests in other countries. 
The Economic Development Institute might also help upgrade 
the capacity of training institutions in the FSU that deal with 
rural finance. Modern data processing, new accounting 
procedures, making creditworthy loans, deposit mobilization, and 
employee incentives are a few of the topics that might be 
emphasized in this training-of-trainers. 
Financial transactions lean heavily on contract and banking 
law. This includes laws affecting loan collateral and bank 
regulation. The bulk of these laws should be in place before 
creating rural financial markets. 
Food supply problems may compel the Bank to fund stop-gap 
programs aimed at augmenting agricultural production in the midst 
of economic chaos. Targeted credit programs are a tempting way 
of doing this because they are easy to design, can be used to 
move large amounts of money, may disburse rapidly, and 
demonstrate a response to critical problems. The Bank may want 
to answer several questions before funding such programs: If 
borrowers are required to pay positive real rates of interest 
will the Bank's funds disburse? If the funds are disbursed, will 
loans be repaid? Will the program retard policy and 
institutional reforms? Will the program have the desired effect 
on borrowers' production decisions? Will the program leave a 
residue that may hinder the future development of efficient 
financial markets? Are there better ways to stimulate production 
than credit? It is possible to answer these questions by long 
distance? 
Instead of funding credit programs under chaotic conditions, 
the Bank might consider programs around the fringe of finance 
that more directly affect agricultural production in the near 
future. If farm prices are repressed, freeing thea will have a 
much larger impact on production than will any credit program. 
Likewise, if critical input markets have collapsad the Bank might 
focus projects on creating these markets. This could involve 
providing critical inputs such as fertilizer or farm chemicals, 
using sealed-bid auctions to sell these goods to the highest 
bidders, and then recycling the local currency proceeds into 
activities that reinforce economic reforms. 9 such projects 
9The International Fertilizer Development Center and the 
Agency for International Development have successfully used such 
auctions in Romania and Albania to distribute farm inputs. 
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would foster market prices, distribute inputs to producers who 
are most willing to pay for them, reinforce privatization, and 
not stain the financial system. 
Emergency programs in product markets will be more difficult 
to implement, but some experimentation in quasi-finance 
activities may be appropriate. Xf transportation problems and 
lack of competition are major problems, for example, a project 
might focus on establishing organizations that provide vehicles 
to private entrepreneurs through lease-hire or truck-leasing. 
such arrangements might provide employment for ex-military 
personnel, accelerate the replacement of inefficient vehicles, 
and also foster competition in product markets. Xn some cases, 
donors in Western Europe may be willing to provide vehicles for 
such projects. Xn other cases, these project might stimulate 
local manufacturers to produce more efficient vehicles. 
Another alternative would be to focus projects on developing 
information systems that support product and inputs markets. 
This miqht involve forming or strengthening exchanges that 
centralize information on goods available for sale on a cash or 
barter basis, along with developing techniques for disseminating 
price information. Creating bonded warehouses, in some cases, 
may also facilitate marketing and allow private banks to provide 
short-term loans on storable commodities. 
Becoming more stable 
The Bank has more intervention options in countries that are 
further through economic reforms, that are increasingly 
exercising fiscal and monetary discipline, that have declining 
rates of inflation, and that have liberated most prices. Because 
of debilities in the financial system these interventions should 
continue to focus on farm markets, on finance substitutes, and on 
training. 
Under increasingly stable conditions it might be possible 
for the bank to fund projects with major credit components that 
directly strengthen farm input and product markets. A project 
miqht focus on developing a fertilizer marketing system, for 
example. 10 The credit component of the project would provide 
loans to private firms in the fertilizer producing-and-marketing-
system. some of these firms, in turn, would be expected to offer 
informal loans to grease fertilizer sales. A fledgling financial 
system may be able to effectively screen a small number of 
marketing firms even though it is unable to sort a much larger 
number of potential borrowers who are farmers. 
10similar projects might be developed for seed markets and 
animal concentrate markets. 
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If the form~tion of ne! private firms is a Bank priority, it 
may also be poss1ble to des1gn projects that promote equity-
funding arrangements. These equity funds might be invested in 
promising new firms that provide marketing services or in those 
that handle agricultural exports. Because the mortality rate 
among new firms is high, even under the best of circumstances, 
financial institutions avoid lending to these enterprises. on 
the one hand, if half of the borrowing firms fail, and do not 
repay their loans, lenders lose half of the money lent, even if 
the other half of the firms fully repay loans. on the other 
hand, if new firms are largely assisted through equity 
participation, capital gains from some firms that are highly 
successful will offset at least some of the loses inflicted on 
the provider of funds by firms that fail. venture capital may 
be a more appropriate intervention than is medium- or long-term 
credit in promoting formation of new firms for this reason. 
Equity is also easier than debt for entrepreneurs to manage. 
strengthening the capability of the financial system to 
provide financial services in rural areas could also be the focus 
of additional Bank attention in FSU countries that are moving 
toward stability. Large numbers of people must be trained to 
make creditworthy loans, central banks must create the capacity 
to prudently examine and supervise banks, and bank managers must 
be trained to operate financial institutions that support a 
market economy. It will be impossible later to extend many 
creditworthy loans and mobilize deposits without this capacity. 
Relatively stable countries 
Where low rates of inflation, substantial private sectors, 
and liberalized prices exist the Bank can more directly expand 
the volume and variety of financial services in rural areas. 
This should include helping to strengthen or form financial 
institutions, stimulating deposit mobilization, and making short-
terms loans. Inventing ways to provide financial services that 
lower transaction costs for both lender and borrower should also 
be a major objective. This, in turn, will allow the formal 
financial frontier to expand gradually (Von Pischke). care must 
be taken to foster a financial system that is competitive by 
encouraging informal finance to expand and to also encourage 
various forms of formal finance to emerge. 
The first step in this process should be to strengthen and, 
where necessary, to form financial institutions that are willing 
to make creditworthy loans and also mobilize deposits in rural 
areas. It is unlikely that private banks will play a significant 
role in this in the foreseeable future. some combination of 
government banks, development finance companies, new grass roots 
organizations, and cooperatives must be developed to provide 
these financial services. The extent to which the residual 
financial infrastructure of the former Agroprombank and the 
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Savinqs Bank can be used in this rebuildinq is an open question. 
Xn the FSU there were about 3 1 500 branches of the Aqroprombank 
and a major portion of the 75 1 000 branches of the savinqs Bank 
that were located in rural areas. xn many rural localities a 
branch of the Savinqs Bank was the only formal financial facility 
available. Xt seems prudent to include some of these branches in 
any new institutional confiquration. The exact makeup of the 
confiquration must be crafted on a country-by-country basis and 
should involve a variety of institutions, not just a sinqle 
aqricultural development bank owned by the qovernment. 
This institutional development may start before financial 
markets are fully restructured, as lonq as the new proqram is 
consistent with the objectives of overall financial reform. This 
includes makinq loans on the basis of creditworthiness, avoidinq 
concessionary interest rates, and providinq hiqh quality 
financial services (World Bank 1993c). Whatever results from 
this restructurinq, other alternatives to the state owned banks 
must be developed to provide financial services in rural areas. 
Xn some cases these alternatives miqht be qrassroots 
orqanizations that are built alonq the lines of credit unions. 
Xn other cases, multipurpose farm cooperatives miqht be developed 
to provide financial services. 11 Xn still other cases, the 
qovernment may be forced to take the lead in developinq a new 
rural financial institution. If this is the case, it may be 
appropriate to desiqn the institution so it converts to non-
qovernment ownership in a few years. The traditional cooperative 
principle of withholdinq a small percentaqe of a borrower's loan, 
which is then used to buy shares in the financial institution, is 
one way of accomplishinq this qradual conversion. 
After an institution has been identified, the followinq 
sequence of steps should be taken to further develop the system: 
• Provide relatively small amounts of money for short-term 
lendinq, emphasize employee traininq, expand the proqram 
qradually, and provide hiqh quality services. 
• Desiqn employee incentives that are performance driven, that 
stress loan recovery, and that make each branch a profit 
center. 
11The experience with usinq multipurpose cooperatives to 
provide financial services is checkered. such proqrams promoted 
by the u.s., France, Germany, and the United Kinqdom in low-
income countries have qenerally been unsuccessful. The Japanese 
were more successful in developinq self-sustaininq faraers' 
associations in Korea and Taiwan, larqely because they avoided 








Allow lending for any creditworthy purpose in rural areas, 
especially to those agents who might, in turn, on-lend 
informally. 
One~ ~he institutio~ is properly regulated, stress deposit 
mob1l1zation and adJust employee incentives accordingly. 
Set a goal of mobilizing through deposits, within a few 
years, most funds needed for lending. 
Reduce transaction costs for the institution, borrowers, and 
depositors. 
Begin to lengthen the term structure of loans. Avoid making 
long-term loans until the institution is well established. 
Encourage additional organizations to provide financial 
services in rural areas to stimulate competition. 
Identify additional financial services that might be 
provided by financial intermediaries: examples being, 
checking, transfer of funds, foreign exchange, insurance, 
leasing, pawnbroking, and equity funding by a sUbsidiary. 
THE MUSLIM FACTOR 
In countries that have sizable muslim populations finance 
programs might require special molding because of religious 
beliefs, particularly those regarding interest pay.ments. 12 
Returns on deposits, for example, might be labeled as dividends 
or maintenance-of-value payments rather than interest. Likewise, 
payments for loans might be termed service charges instead of 
interest. Lenders may also be forced to enter joint ventures 
with merchants so that markups on merchandise, rather than 
interest, can be used as remuneration for lending. various types 
of profit-sharing arrangements might also be made between lender 
and importers, manufacturers, and also traders. Despite these 
types of innovations, it will be very difficult to develop 
financial services for farmers and consumers if Islamic laws on 
interest payments are strictly enforced. Adherence to the 
ouran's dictums on interest rates is an extreme form of financial 
repression: forcing the system to charge nominal interest rates 
that are zero. 
12For an introduction to these issues see Kazarian. 
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RECOMMENDAT~OHS 
The Bank should avoid interventions in rural finance that 
retard reform by resuscitating policies which employ credit as a 
fiscal tool. credit, regardless of how it is priced, will not 
overcome the lack of profitable investment opportunities or the 
lack of markets. Xf some profitable investment opportunities do 
exist, it is unlikely that credit targeted from afar will collide 
with these opportunities any oftener--and likely less often--than 
did earlier targeted credit from Moscow. Providing loans to 
state-owned enterprises should likewise be avoided. credit 
rationing will be more severe in the emerging new private firms 
than in state-owned enterprises because the new firms are out-of-
the-loop Moreover, if loans are useful to private borrowers they 
will likely be more willing to repay their loans than will state-
owned enterprises. 
Instead of stressing credit interventions initially, it may 
be appropriate for the Bank to treat more fundamental problems in 
farm markets and prices, training, and policies. credit 
interventions are inappropriate in chaotic countries where 
various parts of the agricultural system are in flux or are 
broken. Injecting credit under these conditions is similar to 
putting oil in a bus that is out of gas, whose engine is 
dismantled, and whose driver is not sure if he will be paid for 
either repairing the bus or driving it when fixed. Vital engine 
parts (farm inputs), gasoline (attractive product price), and 
driver incentives (profits) must be in place before the 
lubrication provided by the oil (credit) becomes a limiting 
factor. Credit programs for farmers should be delayed until 
other vital economic ingredients are in place: law-and-order, 
moderate inflation, functioning product and input markets, and 
rationalized prices. 
FSU countries that are beginning to put their economic 
house-in-order provide a broader scope for interventions in rural 
finance. These interventions should focus on inflating and 
facilitating vital marketing activities, rather than providing 
loans directly for farm production. credit projects should also 
give priority to stimulating new private enterprises. Equity 
contributions and leasing may be more appropriate ways of doing 
this than is credit. 
countries that have largely reformed their economies and 
have also imposed fiscal and monetary discipline are more likely 
candidates for conventional Bank programs in rural finance than 
are countries without this discipline. These programs should 
start with institution building, gradually expand short-term 
lending, then begin deposit mobilization, later extend the term 
structure of loans, and still later expand the range of financial 
services provided by financial intermediaries. The lessons 
16 
learned from earlier Bank experiences with rural credit programs 










avoid using the financial system a fiscal agent • 
avoid loan targeting • 
avoid establishinq concessionary rediscount lines • 
avoid neqative real rates of interest on loans and deposits • 
stress deposit mobilization with proper bank requlation • 
stress innovations that reduce transaction costs • 
stress quality of services to enhance loan repayment • 
stress making the rural financial system self sustaining • 
The next several years the Bank must largely learn-by-doinq 
in its incursions into rural financial markets in the FSU. Pilot 
projects should be stressed initially, rather than country-wide 
programs. The Bank should also commit resources to documenting 
what does and does not work in Bank projects as well as learning 
from similar projects carried out by other agencies in the 
region. 13 These evaluations should be done as projects unfold 
so that mid-course corrections are possible. Evaluation 
components should be included in most new rural finance projects. 
A regional capacity to sum experiences by looking across projects 
and countries should also be developed in conjunction with Bank 
projects. 
Bank employees who are concerned about developinq financial 
markets, those focusinq on traininq, and those who primarily deal 
with promoting agricultural development must seek each other's 
advice and assistance when rural finance issues are addressed. 
It may also be advisable for the Bank to assign additional staff 
to focus on problems of developinq rural financial markets in the 
FSU. These portions of the financial systems will be difficult 
to reconstruct and will require time, patience, and specialized 
expertise. 
13unfortunately, neither the post-project evaluations done 
by the operations Evaluation Department nor the more theoretical 
research done by other offices in the Bank fill this need. 
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